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Abstract: The concept of intrinsic credibility has been recently intro-
duced to check the credibility of “out of the blue” findings without any
prior support. A significant result is deemed intrinsically credible if it
is in conflict with a sceptical prior derived from the very same data that
would make the effect non-significant. In this paper I propose to use
Bayesian prior-predictive tail probabilities to assess intrinsic credibil-
ity. For the standard 5% significance level, this leads to a new p-value
threshold that is remarkably close to the recently proposed p < 0.005
standard. I also introduce the credibility ratio, the ratio of the upper to
the lower limit of a standard confidence interval for the corresponding
effect size. I show that the credibility ratio has to be smaller than 5.8
such that a significant finding is also intrinsically credible. Finally, a
p-value for intrinsic credibility is proposed that is a simple function
of the ordinary p-value and has a direct frequentist interpretation in
terms of the probability of replicating an effect.
Key Words: Confidence Interval; Credibility Ratio; Intrinsic Credibil-
ity; Prior-Data Conflict; P-value; Replication; Significance Test
1 Introduction
The so-called replication crisis of science has been discussed extensively within the
scientific community (Ioannidis, 2005; Begley and Ioannidis, 2015). One aspect of the
problem is the widespread misunderstanding and misinterpretation of basic statistical
concepts, such as the p-value (Cohen, 1994; Greenland et al., 2016). This has lead to
a major rethinking and new proposals for statistical inference, such as to lower the
threshold for statistical significance from the traditional 0.05 level to 0.005 (Johnson,
2013; Benjamin et al., 2018). The proposal has created a lot of discussion in the sci-
entific community and the shortcut “p < 0.005” has been even shortlisted and highly
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commended in the Statistic of the Year competition by the Royal Statistical Society, see
http://bit.ly/2yWFPbD.
Two arguments for this step are provided in Benjamin et al. (2018): The first is based
on the Bayes factor, the second is based on the false discovery rate. Both arguments
are actually not new, Edwards et al. (1963) have already emphasized that the evidence
of p-values around 0.05 against a point null hypothesis, as quantified by the Bayes
factor, is much smaller than one would naively expect: “Even the utmost generosity to
the alternative hypothesis cannot make the evidence in favor of it as strong as classical
significance levels might suggest.” Likewise, Staquet et al. (1979) have already argued
that the false positive rate “could be considerably reduced by increasing the sample
sizes and by restricting the allowance made for the α error, which should be set to
a 1% level as a minimum requirement.” Benjamin et al. (2018) therefore propose
to lower the threshold for statistical significance to 0.005 and to declare results with
0.05 > p > 0.005 as “suggestive”, emphasizing the need for replication.
In this paper I provide a new argument for this categorization into three levels of
evidence. The approach is based on the concept of intrinsic credibility (Matthews,
2018), a specific reverse-Bayes method to assess the credibility of claims of new dis-
coveries. I review and refine the approach and show that, if you dichotomize p-values
into “significant” and “non-significant”, the proposed method naturally leads to a
more stringent threshold for intrinsic credibility. For the standard 5% significance
level, the new p-value threshold is 0.0056, remarkably close to the recently proposed
p < 0.005 standard.
To assess intrinsic credibility based on a confidence interval rather than a p-value, I
propose the credibility ratio, the ratio of the upper to the lower limit of a standard con-
fidence interval for the corresponding effect size. I show that the credibility ratio has
to be smaller than 5.8 to ensure that a significant finding is also intrinsically credible.
In Section 2 I provide a brief summary of the Analysis of Credibility and the specific
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concept of intrinsic credibility. The latter is central for the derivation of a threshold for
intrinsic credibility, as outlined in Section 3.
Lowering the threshold of statistical significance is only a temporary measure to
the replication crisis (Ioannidis, 2018). A more radical step would be to abandon
significance thresholds altogether (McShane et al., 2018), leaving p-values as a purely
quantitative measure of the evidence against a point null hypothesis. In this spirit
I extend the concept of intrinsic credibility and propose in Section 4 the p-value for
intrinsic credibility, pIC. This new measure can be used to quantify the evidence
for intrinsic credibility – without any need for thresholding – and has a direct and
useful interpretation in terms of the probability of replicating an effect (Killeen, 2005).
Intrinsic credibility is thus directly linked to replication, a topic of central importance
in the current debate on research reproducibility (Goodman et al., 2016). I close with
some discussion in Section 5.
2 Analysis of Credibility
Reverse-Bayes approaches allow the extraction of the properties of the prior distribu-
tion needed to achieve a certain posterior statement for the data at hand. The idea to
use Bayes’s theorem in reverse originates in the work by IJ Good (Good, 1950, 1983)
and is increasingly used to assess the plausibility of scientific claims and findings
(Greenland, 2006, 2011; Held, 2013; Colquhoun, 2017). Matthews (2001a,b) has pro-
posed the Analysis of Credibility, a specific reverse-Bayes method to challenge claims
of “significance”, see Matthews (2018) for more recent developments.
Analysis of Credibility is based on a conventional confidence interval of level γ, say,
for an unknown effect size θ with lower limit L and upper limit U, say. In the following
I assume that both L and U are symmetric around the effect estimate θˆ (assumed to
be normally distributed) and that both are either positive or negative, i. e. the effect is
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significant at significance level α = 1− γ. Matthews (2001a,b) proposed assessing the
credibility of a statistically significant finding by computing from the data a sceptical
prior distribution for the effect size θ, normal with mean zero, that - combined with the
information given in the confidence interval for θ - results in a posterior distribution
which is just non-significant at level α, i. e. either the α/2 or the 1 − α/2 posterior
quantile is zero. It can be shown that the limits ±S of the corresponding equi-tailed
prior credible interval at level γ are given by
S =
(U − L)2
4
√
UL
, (1)
where S is called the scepticism limit and the interval [−S, S] is called the critical prior
interval. Note that (1) holds for any level γ, not just for the traditional 95% level.
It is convenient to express the variance τ2 of the sceptical prior as a function of the
variance σ2 (the squared standard error, assumed to be known) of the estimate θˆ, the
corresponding test statistic t = θˆ/σ, and zα/2, the 1− α/2 quantile of the standard
normal distribution:
τ2 =
σ2
t2/z2α/2 − 1
, (2)
where t2 > z2α/2 is required for significance at level α. Equation (2) shows that the prior
variance τ2 can be both smaller or larger than σ2, depending on the value of t2. If t2 is
substantially larger than z2α/2, then the sceptical prior variance will be relatively small,
i. e. a relatively tight prior is needed to make the significant result non-significant. If
t2 is close to z2α/2 (i. e. the effect is “borderline significant”), then the sceptical prior
variance will be relatively large, i. e. a relatively vague prior is sufficient to make the
significant result non-significant.
Two applications of the Analysis of Credibility are shown in Figure 1. Both are
based on a confidence interval of width 3, but with different location (θˆ = 2.5 and
11/6 = 1.83, respectively). Each Figure has to be read from right to left: To obtain a
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95% posterior credible interval with lower limit 0 (shown in green), the 95% confid-
ence interval for the unknown effect size θ (shown in red) has to be combined with a
sceptical prior with variance (2) (shown in blue).
In this paper I focus on claims of new discoveries without any prior support. To
assess the credibility of such “out of the blue” findings, Matthews (2018) suggested
the concept of intrinsic credibility, declaring an effect as intrinsically credible if it is in
conflict with the sceptical prior (with mean zero and variance (2)) that would make
the effect non-significant. This can be thought of as an additional check to ensure that
a significant effect is not spurious. Specifically, Matthews (2018) declares a result as
intrinsically credible at level γ, if the effect estimate θˆ is outside the sceptical prior
interval, i. e.
∣∣θˆ∣∣ > S. He shows that, for confidence intervals at level γ = 0.95, this
is equivalent to the conventional two-sided p-value being smaller than 0.0127. I refine
the definition of intrinsic credibility in the following Section 3 based on the Box (1980)
prior-predictive approach, leading to the more stringent p-value threshold 0.0056 for
intrinsic credibility at the 95% level.
3 A new threshold for intrinsic credibility
Matthews’ check for intrinsic credibility compares the size of θˆ with the scepticism
limit (1), so does not take the uncertainty of θˆ into account. He compares the estimate
θˆ with the (sceptical) prior distribution, not with the corresponding prior-predictive
distribution. However, use of the latter is the established way to check the compat-
ibility of the data and the prior (Box, 1980; Greenland, 2006). In what follows I will
therefore apply the approach by Box (1980) for the assessment of prior-data conflict
based on the prior-predictive distribution, with the perhaps slightly unusual feature
that the prior has been derived from the data. I argue that there is nothing intrinsically
inconsistent in investigating the compatibility of a prior, defined through the data, and
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Figure 1: Analysis of intrinsic credibility for two confidence intervals at level γ = 95%.
In the first example there is conflict between the sceptical prior and the data
and the significant result is intrinsically credible at the 95% level (L = 1,
U = 4, credibility ratio = 4, pIC = 0.021). In the second example there is less
conflict between prior and data and the significant result is not intrinsically
credible at the 95% level (L = 1/3, U = 10/3, credibility ratio = 10, pIC =
0.09). The credibility ratio will be described further in Section 3 while the
p-value pIC for intrinsic credibility will be introduced in Section 4.
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the data itself, extending an argument by Cox (2006, Section 5.10) to the reverse-Bayes
setting.
The Box (1980) check for prior-data conflict is based on the prior-predictive distribu-
tion, which is in our case normal with mean zero and variance τ2 + σ2 (Spiegelhalter
et al., 2004, Section 5.8). The procedure is based on the test statistic tBox = θˆ/
√
τ2 + σ2
and the (two-sided) tail probability pBox = Pr(χ2(1) ≥ t2Box) as the corresponding up-
per tail of a χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom. Small values of pBox indicate
a conflict between the sceptical prior and the data.
Now suppose we fix the confidence level at the conventional 95% level, i. e. γ =
0.95. Intrinsic credibility at the 95% level (i. e. pBox < 0.05) can then be shown to
be equivalent to the requirement p < 0.0056 for the conventional two-sided p-value.
To derive this result, note that with (2) we have τ2 + σ2 = σ2/(1− z2α/2/t2) and so
t2Box = t
2 − z2α/2. The requirement t2Box > z2α/2 for intrinsic credibility at level γ = 1− α
then translates to
t2 ≥ 2 z2α/2. (3)
This criterion is to be compared with the traditional check for significance, which
requires only t2 ≥ z2α/2. It follows directly that the threshold
αIC = 2
{
1−Φ
(
t =
√
2 zα/2
)}
, (4)
here Φ(.) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function, can be used
to assess intrinsic credibility based on the conventional two-sided p-value p: If p is
smaller than αIC, then the result is intrinsically credible at level γ = 1− α. For α = 0.05
we have t =
√
2 · 1.96 = 2.77 and the threshold (4) turns out to be αIC = 0.0056, as
claimed above. For other confidence levels we will obtain other intrinsic credibility
thresholds. For example, Clayton and Hills (1993, Section 10.1) prefer to use 90%
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confidence intervals “on the grounds that they give a better impression of the range
of plausible values”. Then γ = 0.9 and we obtain the intrinsic credibility threshold
αIC = 0.02.
Figure 2 compares the new threshold with the one obtained by Matthews (2018, Ap-
pendix A.4) (using t = 1.272 zα/2) for values of α below 10%. The Matthews threshold
for intrinsic credibility is larger than the proposed new threshold (4), because it com-
pares the effect estimate θˆ with the prior distribution (with variance τ2) and not the
prior-predictive distribution (with variance τ2 + σ2).
α
α
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0.00
0.01
0.03
0.0056
0.02
0.0127
0.036
0.05
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Figure 2: The threshold for intrinsic credibility of significant results as a function of the
conventional α level. The blue line corresponds to the proposal by Matthews
(2018). The red line is the proposed new threshold.
Intrinsic credibility can also be assessed based on the confidence interval [L, U],
rather than the conventional p-value p. To see this, note that t2Box can be written in
terms of L and U,
t2Box = z
2
α/2
4 UL
(U − L)2 , (5)
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and the requirement t2Box ≥ z2α/2 for intrinsic credibility is then equivalent to require
that the credibility ratio U/L (or L/U if both L and U are negative) fulfills
U
L
≤ d = 3+ 2
√
2 ≈ 5.8. (6)
To derive the cut-point d in (6), set U = L d. The requirement t2Box = z
2
α/2 then reduces
to
1 =
4 UL
(U − L)2 =
4 d
(d− 1)2 ,
a quadratic equation in d with d = 3+ 2
√
2 as solution.
Thus, there is a second way to assess intrinsic credibility based on the ratio of the
limits of a confidence interval at any level γ: if the credibility ratio is smaller than 5.8
than the result is credible at level γ. For example, in Figure 1 the credibility ratio is 4 in
the top and 10 in the bottom panel, so the result shown in the top panel is intrinsically
credible at level 95%, but the one in the bottom is not.
If the sceptical prior distribution is available, then a third way to assess intrinsic
credibility is to compare the prior variance τ2 to the data variance σ2. Comparing (2)
with (3) it is easy to see that intrinsic credibility is achieved if and only if the sceptical
prior variance τ2 is not larger than the variance σ2 of the effect estimate θˆ. With this
in mind we see immediately from Figure 1 that the first result shown in the top panel
is intrinsically credible (τ2 < σ2), whereas the second isn’t (τ2 > σ2).
4 A p-value for intrinsic credibility
A disadvantage of the dichotomous assessment of intrinsic credibility described in
the previous section is the dependence on the confidence level γ of the underlying
confidence interval, or, equivalently, the significance level α = 1− γ. However, there
is a way to free ourselves from this dependence. In analogy to the well-known duality
10
of confidence intervals and standard p-values, I propose to derive the value α?, say,
that just achieves intrinsic credibility, i. e. where equality holds in (3). This defines the
p-value for intrinsic credibility pIC = α?, which provides a quantitative assessment of the
evidence for intrinsic credibility. Of course, the p-value for intrinsic credibility pIC can
also be used to assess intrinsic credibility as described in Section 3: if pIC ≤ α, then
the result is intrinsically credible at level γ = 1− α.
The p-value pIC for intrinsic credibility can be derived by replacing αIC with p and
α with pIC in equation (7) and then solving for pIC:
pIC = 2
[
1−Φ
(
t/
√
2
)]
. (7)
Here t = Φ−1(1− p/2) is the standard test statistic for significance where p is the
conventional two-sided p-value. Note that the test statistic tI = t/
√
2 for intrinsic
credibility in (7) is a root-2 shrunken version of the test statistic t for significance.
Figure 3 shows that the p-value pIC for intrinsic credibility is considerably larger
than the conventional p-value p, particularly for small values of p. For example, the
two confidence intervals shown in Figure 1 have conventional p-values p = 0.0011
(top) and p = 0.017 (bottom), while the corresponding p-values for intrinsic credibility
are pIC = 0.021 and pIC = 0.09, respectively. If we are prepared to adapt the “rough
and ready” p-value guide by Bland (2015, Section 9.4) to pIC, then pIC = 0.021 provides
moderate evidence and pIC = 0.09 only weak evidence for intrinsic credibility.
There is a direct and useful interpretation of pIC in terms of the probability of rep-
licating an effect (Killeen, 2005), i. e. the probability that an identically designed but
independent replication study will give an estimated effect θˆ2 in the same direction
as the estimate θˆ1 = θˆ from the current (first) study. To see this, note that under
an initial uniform prior the posterior for θ is θ | θˆ1 ∼ N(θˆ1, σ2). This posterior now
serves as the prior for the mean of the (unobserved) estimate θˆ2 | θ ∼ N(θ, σ2) from
11
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Figure 3: The p-value for intrinsic credibility as a function of the p-value for signific-
ance. The grey dashed line is the identity line.
the second (hypothetical) study, where we assumed the two studies to be identically
designed, having equal variances σ2. This leads to the prior-predictive distribution
θˆ2 | θˆ1 ∼ N(θˆ1, 2 σ2) and the p-value for intrinsic credibility (7) can be seen to be twice
the probability that the second study will give an estimate θˆ2 in the opposite direction
as the estimate θˆ1 of the first study:
pIC = 2
[
1−Φ
(
t/
√
2
)]
= 2Φ
(
−t/
√
2
)
= 2Φ
(
0− θˆ1√
2σ
)
= 2 Pr(θˆ2 ≤ 0 | θˆ1 > 0).
If θˆ1 < 0, then pIC = 2 Pr(θˆ2 ≥ 0 | θˆ1 < 0).
The probability Pr(θˆ2 ≤ 0 | θˆ1 > 0) is one of the three replication probabilities that
12
have been considered by Senn (2002) in response to Goodman (1992). The comple-
mentary probability Pr(θˆ2 > 0 | θˆ1 > 0) = 1− pIC/2 can be identified as the prob-
ability of replicating an effect, prep, advocated by Killeen (2005) as an alternative to
traditional p-values, see Lecoutre and Poitevineau (2014); Killeen (2015) for further
discussion and additional references. Of course, prep can only be correct under the
assumption that the null hypothesis is false. Nevertheless, Killeen (2005, 2015) argues
that prep is a useful alternative to traditional p-values.
In practice, we can thus use pIC to assess the probability of replicating an effect,
assuming that the null hypothesis is false: prep = 1− pIC/2. An intrinsically credible
result with pIC ≤ γ therefore has prep ≥ (1+ γ)/2. For example, for γ = 95% we have
prep ≥ 97.5%. For numerical illustration, recall that the p-values for intrinsic credibility
in Figure 1 are pIC = 0.021 (top) and pIC = 0.09 (bottom). The corresponding replic-
ation probabilities are thus prep = 99.0% and prep = 95.5%. In the second example,
there is thus a prep = 4.5% chance that an identically designed replication study will
give a negative effect estimate.
5 Discussion
Based on the Analysis of Credibility, I have shown that, if you dichotomize p-values
into “significant” and “non-significant” at some pre-specified threshold α, the Analysis
of Credibility directly leads to a more stringent threshold αIC for intrinsic credibility.
If you prefer to avoid any thresholding of conventional p-values, a new p-value for in-
trinsic credibility, pIC, has been proposed. pIC is a quantitative measure of the evidence
for intrinsic credibility with a direct connection to prep, the probability of replicating
an effect (Killeen, 2005).
The assessment of intrinsic credibility can be thought of as an additional challenge,
ensuring that claims of new discoveries are not spurious. Conventionally significant
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results with 0.05 > p > 0.0056 lack intrinsic credibility, i. e. they are not in conflict
with a sceptical prior that would make the effect non-significant. This matches the
classification as “suggestive” by Benjamin et al. (2018). Specifically, p > 0.0056 implies
pIC > 0.05 and thus prep < 97.5%, emphasizing the need for replication. If p < 0.0056,
then the result is both significant and intrinsically credible at the 95% level, so pIC ≤
0.05 and prep ≥ 97.5%.
The credibility ratio provides a simple and convenient tool to check whether a “sig-
nificant” confidence interval at any level γ is also intrinsically credible. If the credibil-
ity ratio is smaller 5.8, the result can be considered as intrinsically credible at level γ.
It is noteworthy that the concept of intrinsic credibility does not require to change the
original confidence level γ. Indeed, the check for credibility is done at the same level
as the original confidence level. I have used γ = 0.95 by convention, where it follows
that the check for intrinsic credibility is equivalent to the requirement p < 0.0056. This
implies that in standard statistical reporting there is no need to replace 95% confidence
intervals with 99.5% confidence intervals, say. However, I suggest to complement or
to replace the ordinary p-value with the proposed p-value for intrinsic credibility, pIC.
Although derived using a Bayesian approach, the proposed check for intrinsic cred-
ibility is based on a standard confidence interval and thus constitutes a Bayes/non-
Bayes compromise (Good, 1992). Specifically, it does not require the specification of
a prior probability of the null hypothesis of no effect. In fact, this prior probability
is always zero. This is in contrast to the calibration of p-values to lower bounds on
the posterior probability of the null, which requires specification of a prior probability.
Minimum Bayes factors have also been proposed to calibrate p-values, see Held and
Ott (2018) for a recent review. They have the advantage that they do not require spe-
cification of a prior probability of the null hypothesis and provide a direct “forward-
Bayes” assessment of the evidence of p-values. However, the underlying rationale is
14
still based on a point null hypothesis with positive prior probability, fundamentally
different from the approach proposed here.
The Analysis of Credibility assumes a simple mathematical framework, where like-
lihood, prior and posterior are all normally distributed. This can be justified because
Gaussian approximations are commonly used in the calculation of confidence inter-
vals and statistical hypothesis tests, if the sample size is fairly large (e. g. Spiegelhalter
et al., 2004, Section 2.4). Of course, suitable transformations of the parameter of in-
terest may be needed to achieve normality, for example, confidence intervals for odds
ratios and hazard ratios should be transformed to the log scale. For small studies,
however, the normal assumption for the likelihood may be questionable and the as-
sessment of intrinsic credibility would need appropriate refinement, for example based
on the t-distribution.
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